Abstract. In recent years, Massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) have been increasingly popular. Considering the limits of the traditional architectures, MMOGs based on the peer-to-peer networks have many advantages: scalability, computation cost, reliability and concurrency. Researchers have made improvements on this protocol to enhance its security since Chan et al.
Introduction
MMOGs allow a multitude of players to act together concurrently in a virtual game world over the Internet [1] . Many games such as Word of Warcraft, EVE Online, and Final Fantasy XI have shown that MMOGs are a thriving business industry [2] . Players can play against each other or play in teams to complete some missions, which provides more entertainment than single-player games and attracts many people of different age, gender, and background to join [3] . Currently the prevalent game architecture are client-server architectures, in which main functionalities of the virtual environment such as user identification and state management are achieved on the server [4] . However, this architecture has the two limitations: low scalability and high costs of bandwidth and computation. When thousands of players are online simultaneously, MMOGs can produce huge network traffic and processing loads [5] , making the server under great pressure. To solve this issue, the game company would over-provision a large number of servers [6, 7] at an unpredictable expense. A possible solution to the limitations is the use of peer-to-peer architectures [8] . In 2004, an architecture using the peer-to-peer networking model to host MMOGs was proposed by Knutsson et al [9] . The difference between them is that computation cost and network load in peer-to-peer architectures are distributed among peers, achieving high scalability [10] and low cost. That is, peer-to-peer architectures are capable of solving problems prevalent in traditional architectures.
Although peer-to-peer architectures provide considerable support for scalability of MMOGs and other advantages over traditional client-server games, they still have to face a few key challenges [11, 12] . Security is probably the most important one of these challenges, which is caused by the fact that players' communications are out of control of the server. Furthermore, a malicious player may take advantage of this point to attack others, so that it is vital for MMOGs to prevent cheating.
Traditional cryptographic techniques preventing cheating are to sign each update message of each round with players' public and private key pairs, which requires a large amount of computation when players send and verify event update messages. For efficiency, Chan et al. [13] proposed an efficient and secure event signature (EASES) protocol to sign a sequence of event update messages by applying one-time signature and the hash-chain keys. In EASES protocol, only the first signature is signed by the public-key cryptography and the following update messages are signed by hash-chain keys with hash function, which immensely reduces the computation cost compared to digital signatures. Chan et al. proposed another protocol called dynamic EASES based on the basic EASES protocol. The dynamic EASES protocol omits the pre-generation of hash-chain keys to reduce the costs of memory usage and preparation time. However, both methods do not solve the security problem existing in P2P-based MMOGs because the attacker can still forge event update messages except the first message signed by public-key cryptography. In 2009, Li et al. [14] made an improvement on the EASES protocol by adding a timestamp in sending event update messages. But this method is not practical. Later Li et al. proposed another scheme to prevent the replay attack by adding a unique game session number, while the forgery attack still exits [15] . In 2013, Yuan et al. proposed a new secure event signature protocol [16] . His protocol based on the discrete algorithms and bilinear pairing overcomes the forgery attack and replay attack, providing higher security service than other protocols introduced above. Owing to bilinear pairing requiring more computation cost, the efficiency is also higher than above protocols.
In this paper, we propose a new scheme which not only are secure but also makes communications process more efficient. Our protocol does not need to use public-key cryptography to sign any event update messages, and only hash operations are required when update messages are transmitted, enhancing the whole efficiency of our protocol.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some preliminaries. We then review previous protocols and point out their main problems in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose an improved protocol and analyze its security and performance in Section 5. Section 6 is the conclusion. Diffie-Hellman problem [17] . We suppose Alice and Bob wish to agree on a common secret key. They first need to agree on a large prime number p and an integer g with 22 gp ≤≤−. The prime p and the primitive root g can be publicly known. The specific agreement process is as follows.
Preliminaries
• 
Previous Protocols Analysis
In this section we will introduce two previous protocols: the EASES protocol and the protocol of Li et al. are similar to the basic EASES in essence, so that they are not introduced here. First, we define some notations mentioned in protocols' equation in Table 1 . Now let us first introduce the EASES protocol in detail, which is the basis of other protocols. The EASES protocol. In 2008, Chan et al. proposed a novel idea that just uses one-time signature and a series of hash-chain keys to achieve the same cheat-proof properties of digital signatures. In specific realization player i first chooses a random number as master key MK i to compute a series of signature keys. Then only the first one-time signature key will be signed by player i 's private key, and other keys are based on the relationship of the hash-chain keys. So minimal digital signature operations enhance the protocol's efficiency. The EASES protocol has four phases: initialization phase, signature phase, verification phase and re-initialization phase. Actually, the last phase is not necessary and not described in our paper. The only way to obtain it is to compute it by the public parameter x pub Pg = , which means that its difficulty equals to solving the DL problem. So this protocol is much safer than previous protocols. Whereas, the security is achieved at the expense of its efficiency.
Our Proposed Protocol
Design Principles. We find in the EASES protocol all information to compute hash verification is directly transmitted in public form, and therefore it is easy for attackers to forge corresponding hash values of fake messages. This process is transparent to the receiver, for those fake update messages can pass his or her verification. To prevent this attack, some information must be transmitted in a private way. The protocol of Yuan et al. solves the security problem with discrete logarithms and bilinear pairing. However, just as what he says in paper, the efficiency is not good enough due to bilinear pairing. In order to enhance efficiency under the premise of security, we make any two players agree on a common secret key through key agreement protocol before sending the first update message. This secret key is used to sign later update messages for each round between them. Because it is not directly transmitted in the whole process, attackers cannot work out the key value with intercepted messages, ensuring good security. Moreover, only hash operations are required on both sides when update messages are sent, which enhances the whole efficiency. Our Protocol. In our protocol, Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is selected to help any two players agree on a common secret key, which has been introduced in Section 2. To prevent negotiation process from being attacked by intermediary when they send their public keys to others, every player's public key will be put on central server when he or she joins the P2P networks. A sender can securely obtain a receiver's public key from central server, and then compute a secret key with his or her own private key. Simultaneously, the receiver can also figure out the same key in the similar way. Communications security of later update messages between them will be guaranteed by this common key. Our protocol has three phases: initialization phase, signature phase and verification phase. The specific process is as follows.
Initialization Phase. a) Suppose player j is one of receivers, player i first gets player j 's public key mod to re-compute a hash value to verify whether it equals to the received value 1 r i δ − or not. If it holds, player j can be sure that the update message is from player i and has not been modified. Fig. 2 shows the main process of this protocol. to try is to gain private key x of the sender by his or her public key (mod) x pkgp = with g and p, whose difficulty equals to solving the Diffie-Hellman problem.
In our protocol, each round has a different one-time signature key, and these keys can be verified by the relationship 1 ()
, guaranteeing that messages replayed by an attacker are not accepted as valid. Simultaneously, # gno is not a duplicate value representing one-time session, and different session has different # gno . It is used to prevent an attacker from collecting the messages that the normal player has sent in a whole session, and then replaying them to impersonate that player. Thus, the replay attack is also prevented by our protocol. Performance Analysis. In the initialization phase, there are many time-consuming one-time operations for all protocols. Because they won't be operated when event update messages are sent, we don't consider them here. Table 2 shows what operations a player need to do for each round, in which N denotes the number of players, hash denotes one hash operation, bp denotes one bilinear pairing operation and ep denotes one exponent operation. From the comparisons, we can see that in the signature phase, our protocol computes N-1 times hash operations instead of one like basic EASES, because any two players have a different secret key. And the protocol of Yuan et al. requires one hash operation and one exponent operation in this phase. When a player's update message is verified in the verification phase, the basic EASES protocol and ours just need to compute one hash operation, however, besides that, Yuan et al.'s has to compute two additional more time-consuming pairing operations. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we first introduce several previous event signature protocols based on peer-to-peer architectures and then point out their problems about security and efficiency. To have a better efficiency with security, we propose an improved one with the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. Our protocol has achieved the two basic requirements of unforgeability and verifiability, and is capable of preventing the forgery attack and replay attack. Moreover, when event update messages are transmitted, only hash operations are required, which makes the efficiency of our protocol close to the original one and better than Yuan et al.'s. Meanwhile, the security is guaranteed by the Diffie-Hellman problem. In the following work, we plan to improve this protocol considering its fair retransmission mechanism and better real-time.
